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Abstract
Through a field study of a long-term interfirm relationship between a managing agent and 
an outsourcer of facilities management services, an interactive relationship between 
accounting, control and trust is expressed. It is demonstrated how control produces trust, 
how trust produces implicit control and influences formal control, and how accounting 
comes to be a safeguarding as well as a trust building device. Moreover, the study shows 
how contextual factors, particularly the institutional environment and boundary spanners, 
may influence the interaction between trust and control and, therefore, the development 
of the governance of the interfirm relationship. Hence, theoretical implications on the 
accounting-control-trust nexus are enlightened.
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Introduction
There has been a proliferation of accounting studies dealing with interfirm transactional 
relationships during the last decade or so. One of the major drivers is the call from 
eminent scholars in the field that the scope of management control no longer confines 
within the legal boundaries of firms (Otley, 1994) and that there should be a more 
thorough examination of the accounting and informational consequences of more explicit 
concerns with the management of supply chains (Hopwood, 1996). These calls were in 
response to changing organizational realities, characterized by different forms of 
interfirm relationships such as joint ventures, franchises, joint research and development, 
long term supply relationships and outsourcing relationships.
This paper aims to contribute to the knowledge production on management control in 
interfirm relationships. It particularly focuses on the relationship between control and 
trust. To a large extent, prior studies in this area took a rationalists approach (inter alia a 
transaction cost economics approach) and aimed at discovering mechanisms, archetypes 
or patterns of control (e.g; Dekker, 2004; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003; Tomkins, 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). However, 
there have also been performative studies that discussed and investigated control and trust 
‘in the making’ by drawing upon actor network theory (e.g; Mouritsen and Thrane, 2006; 
Chua and Mahama, 2007).
Both control and trust have been seen as instrumental in absorbing uncertainty and 
behavioral risks. The predominant view is that these instruments are either substitutive or 
complementary to each other (Dekker, 2004). The substitution perspective shows an 
inverse relationship between control and trust, which implies that less control leads to 
more trust and vice versa. For example, trust may be a substitute to control in 
relationships where transactions are highly complex and the environment is highly 
uncertain (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). The complementary perspective 
reveals control and trust as being mutually reinforcing. The exchange of control related 
accounting information may, at an early stage of the interfirm relationship, generate 
positive expectations (Tomkins, 2001; Emsley & Kidon, 2007) about the future. In an 
interactive perspective, the focus is on how (mis)trust produces control and how control
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produces (mis)trust. Such an interactive perspective focuses on process. It shifts the focus 
from rather simple ‘and/or’ or ‘and/and/ questions towards questions concerning the 
dynamics of the relationship between control and trust. These questions include the 
question as to how accounting is implicated in these dynamics, i.e. how accounting is 
implicated in the (re)shaping and use of formal controls and in the building (or 
destroying) of trust. Although it is tempting to connect contractually agreed upon 
accounting information with contract-based formal controls, while connecting accounting 
information that is voluntarily exchanged to trust building (Vosselman and Van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2009), this paper demonstrates a more complex relationship. Particularly, 
it is demonstrated that the (changes in) formal accounting and control system may also 
help producing cooperation and trust. In doing so, not only the monitoring, supervising 
and rewarding aspects of control are revealed, but also its more salient aspects of 
coordination (Vélez et. al , 2008) and the (related) aspects of relational signaling that 
could help in building trust (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). As for the 
monitoring, supervising and rewarding aspects of control we suggest that they have the 
propensity to mitigate relational risk (Seal, Cullen, Dunlop, Berry & Ahmed, 1999) by 
compensating for legitimate mistrust and by producing thin trust (Vosselman and Van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2009). As for the coordination and relational signaling aspects of 
formally agreed upon accounting controls, the analyses and interpretations particularly 
suggest both formal and informal accounting to be important for the building and 
maintenance of trust in the relationship.
The interaction between control and trust and the implication of accounting in that 
interaction do not take place in a vacuum. There are contextual factors and external 
institutions influencing this interaction. Therefore, this study aims to contribute by 
demonstrating the interaction between control and trust in a specific context and over a 
specific period of time. It emphasizes both processes and the context in which processes 
unfold. By doing so we respond to the latest calls in the management accounting 
community to put more emphasis on the processes and dynamics of interfirm 
relationships (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008) and the influence of external institutions on the 
design of hybrid control structures (Berry et.al, 2009).
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The field study concerns the long-term outsourcing of the management of facilities 
services by a big semiconductor company. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in 
order to understand and analyze the development of the relationship as well as the 
interaction between control and trust and the way accounting is implicated in that 
interaction. The computer program ATLAS.ti was used for the coding, management and 
analysis of the data.
This paper makes four contributions to the extant literature on the ‘accounting-control- 
trust’- nexus in interfirm relationships. First, it adds to many prior studies that highlight 
the need for trust in situations where the interfirm relationship involves considerable 
complexity, uncertainty and continuous change (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2000; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008) by demonstrating that trust may also be 
functionally present in relationships with low or moderate levels of uncertainty and 
complexity. Second, it is observed and demonstrated that control produces trust through 
its coordinating aspect (Véléz et al., 2008), thus supporting a conclusion by Coletti et al. 
(2005) on intrafirm collaborative in the area of interfirm relationships. Particularly, it is 
expressed how the negotiation and the use of formal controls may exceed safeguarding 
behavior (and, thus, the compensation of appropriation concerns through an alignment of 
interests) by revealing cooperative behavior and by giving relational signals. Third, the 
field study shows how the relationship between control and trust becomes dynamic and 
interactive. It demonstrates how accounting information in any form (formal or informal) 
affects the level of trust and how trust may create a powerful implicit control structure. 
Fourth, it is demonstrated that an effective interaction between control and trust requires 
a certain context. Boundary spanners and the institutional environment prove to be of 
great importance for a successful development of the outsourcing relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical background of the paper and its theoretical ambitions. Section 3 describes the 
research methodology. Section 4 gives a description of the field study and the shaping of 
the governance. Section 5 contains the theoretical implications of the field study and in 
the final section conclusions are drawn.
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Control and trust in interfirm relationships: theoretical basis and theoretical 
ambitions
Organizational control has been defined as the processes by which organizations govern 
their activities so that they continue to achieve the objectives they set for themselves 
(Emmanuel et al. 1990). It is a process of regulation and monitoring for the achievement 
of organizational goals (Das & Teng, 2001, pp.258). Management control is about 
strategic issues (the general stance of the organization towards its environment) as well as 
operational issues (the effective implementation of plans designed to achieve overall 
goals (Emmanuel et al. 1990). There are two major types of control: external measure- 
based control and internal value-based control (Eisenhardt, 1985). We label the external 
measure based control as formal control and the internal value based control as social 
control. The use of formal controls is based on the idea that something which is measured 
is either output of employees (output control) or aspects of their behaviors (behavioral 
control) (Thompson, 1967; Ouchi, 1979). Formal controls relate to the establishment and 
utilization of formal rules, procedures and policies to monitor and reward desirable 
performance. These formal rules, procedures and policies may take the form of 
performance management systems, written down in a contract or in service level 
agreements. Social control pertains to the establishment of organizational norms, values, 
culture and internalization of goals to encourage desirable performance and behavior 
(Das & Teng, 2001). Involvement in the decision making process, rituals, ceremonies, 
orientation programs and networking within and between organizations are examples of 
social controls.
Prior research has shown that in addition to the formal control mechanisms, trust may act 
as a social control mechanism in interfirm relationships (e.g; Sako, 1992; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995; Nooteboom, 1996, 2000; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 
1997; Das & Teng, 1998, 2001; Bachmann, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Inkpen & 
Currall, 2004; Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). Trust is “a type of expectation that 
alleviates the fear that one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically” (Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989, pp. 104). “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations or behavior of another (Rousseau et. al
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1998, pp.395)”. As per Tomkins (2001), trust is the adoption of a belief by one party in a 
relationship that the other party will not act against his or her interests, where this belief 
is held without undue doubt or suspicion and in the absence of detailed information about 
the actions of that other party (pp. 165). And “interorganizational trust represents an 
organization’s expectations that another firm will not act opportunistically when dealing 
with that organization” (Gulati & Sytch, 2008, pp.165).
Partner’s confidence (trust) in each other maintains stable interfirm relationships or 
prevents their failures (Das & Teng, 1998). Trust also encourages partners to accept 
bigger risks and enlarge the scope of the interfirm relationship (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). 
Furthermore, trust can reduce costs of coordination and monitoring, enhance the 
performance of partners, or result in an increase in investments in the relationships (e;g; 
Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 
2003). In other words, trust can provide benefits similar to formal control such as 
reducing risks of opportunism and facilitating adaptation (e.g; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; 
Granovetter; 1985; Macaulay; 1963; Macneil, 1978; Uzzy, 1997) and it could thus be an 
efficient governance mechanism in interfirm relationships (Dyer, 1997). But trust cannot 
be instituted instantaneously as it is developed over time (Nooteboom et al., 1997).
Both (formal) control and trust may be placed under an umbrella of governance1. As 
Nooteboom states, the notion of governance includes the notion of control but it is a 
wider concept (Nooteboom, 1999). Nooteboom (2002) extends the concept of governance 
quite considerably to include issues of trust along with relational risks and transactions 
costs (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). Governance therefore is a broad concept 
that incorporates both control and trust. It safeguards against the opportunistic behavior 
of the parties (e.g; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Dekker, 2004), it 
facilitates coordination (e.g; Kumar and Seth 1998; Dekker, 2004); helps in learning
1 The concept o f ‘governance’ is more broad that the concept o f a ‘governance structure’. A governance structure is the 
“institutional matrix within which transactions are negotiated and executed” (Williamson, 1979, pp.239). Transaction 
cost economics distinguishes three so-called generic governance structures: a market, a hierarchy and a hybrid (such as 
a strategic alliance or a longstanding outsourcing relationship). As a number o f  studies have demonstrated (e.g; Speklé, 
2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000, 2006; Vosselman 2002; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2009), the theory also has the potential to explain (management) control structures that are at a less generic level, there 
being elements within the meta-institution o f a market, a hierarchy or a hybrid.
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(Makhija & Ganesh, 1997); and it provides stability, predictability and adaptation 
mechanisms to an interfirm relationship (Gulati et. al, 2005; Williamson, 1991).
To a large extent, extant literature on management control of interfirm relationships (see 
recent reviews; Berry, et. al., 2009; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2006) discusses the relationship between control and trust as either 
substitutes or complements. Both control and trust have been suggested to be 
instrumental in absorbing uncertainty and behavioral risks (e.g; Dekker, 2004; Emsley & 
Kidon, 2007; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Tomkins, 2001). As substitutes, control 
and trust are inversely related. Transactions characterized by high complexity and high 
uncertainty may necessitate partners to draw more heavily upon trust instead of formal 
control (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). As complements, trust and control 
may be mutually reinforcing. For instance, at early stages of interfirm relationship the 
formal exchange of accounting information (control) may produce positive expectations 
about future behavior and, hence, control could add to trust (Tomkins, 2001; Emsley & 
Kidon, 2007). Control may also show a complex and changing relationship with trust 
over time (Tomkins, 2001). Therefore, the simple complements-substitutes dichotomy 
should be further analyzed (Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). Trust and control may be 
conceptualized as a trust/control duality which implies that trust and control assume 
existence of each other, refer to each other and create each other, yet remain irreducible 
to each other (Möllering, 2005). This duality perspective is similar to the interaction 
perspective on control and trust (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). According 
to them (ibid) the interaction of control and trust is an ongoing dynamic process, and 
accounting can be related to both control and trust building. Accounting for control is 
theorized as a formal safeguarding and icentivizing device and accounting for trust is 
theorized as an informal information sharing device. So, it is suggested that formal 
accounting is related to control whereas informal accounting is related to trust building. 
However, we demonstrate and theorize that a formal accounting system may serve not 
only as a safeguarding device but also as a trust building device. Moreover we theorize 
that although trust building starts from voluntary local positions (and, thus, is a reflection 
of ‘agency’ in the sense of institutional theory), the resulting trust produces a powerful 
structure that imposes constraints on the parties involved (and, thus, is a form of structure
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in the sense of institutional theory). In other words: trust is theorized to be a form of 
implicit control.
Finally, acknowledging that the interaction between control and trust is located in space 
and time, this study theorizes on contextual factors that help shaping the interaction.
Research Methodology
This study seeks to further build on theory on the dynamics of control and trust in 
interfirm relationships. It responds to calls for more in depth process studies on the 
relationship between control and trust (e.g; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). Particularly, it seeks 
to build further theory on the interaction between accounting, control and trust (building). 
The aim is to show the theoretical significance of the interrelated processual implications 
of accounting, control and trust as they are present in the field. We do not aim to test 
extant theory. The nature of our research ambition (theory development) and the 
dynamics that are involved in the research project call for a field study (Yin, 2003, 
Silverman, 2005). The approach to the research is therefore qualitative, we aim to 
position data in order to contribute to theory by an ongoing reflection on data (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006). We start from the position that ‘social reality is emergent, 
subjectively created and objectified through human interaction’ (Chua, 1986) as opposed 
to the existence of an objective reality ‘out there’. In order to contribute to theory, we aim 
to retain the context specific information (authenticity) and draw plausible conclusions 
(Lukka & Modell, 2010).
As researchers we try to live the world of the field (Hastrup, 1997; Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006), but with important theoretical notions (see former section) in our minds. It is not 
the intention to just describe or clarify what is happening in the field, but to infer 
theoretical implications on the accounting-control-trust nexus from a specific time-space 
configuration.
An interfirm relationship between two companies is explored. We study processual 
implications of the management control system, trust and accounting information. In 
addition, we focus on the context within which the interfirm relationship is developing. A 
major source of the data is the semi-structured interviews with questions based on extant
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theory. But, sometimes, new questions (relevant to the broad research questions and 
topic) emerge during the interviews and such discussions and interactions prove to be 
very insightful. Other sources of information include annual reports for 2006, 2007 & 
2008, Service Level Agreements (SLAs), Quarterly Reports, Roadmap documents 
(monthly meetings) and an industry magazine. The documents and interview transcripts 
are used to enhance the reliability of the research. Different sources of evidence are 
analyzed to generate a reliable theoretical interpretation of the case.
The field study started in December 2008 and the majority of the data was collected in 
the period from December 2008 until September 2009. The data was collected by a group 
of three researchers. In total 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted and 
transcribed including one kick off meeting (interview).
The relationship under study was a long-term outsourcing relationship. As our focus was 
on the outsourcer, most of the interviewees were managers of the outsourcing company, 
from different functional areas like facilities management (office-related as well as 
industrial), purchasing and accounting & finance. One interview was with the country 
manager of the outsourcing company. A manager of the managing company (supplier) 
who was directly dealing with the outsourcer was also interviewed. Appendix 1 contains 
more detailed information on the interviewees.
Each interview lasted between 1 and 1 ^  hours. In addition, interim presentations and 
discussion of results were organized at the case company. The discussions during these 
meetings also provided insights about the issues under study and were transcribed and 
used for data analysis. The data is analyzed by using qualitative data analysis software 
ATLAS.ti 6. The list of codes used in the data analysis is presented in appendix 2. This 
software was very helpful in coding, data management and analysis. In field research the 
data collection is a part of data analysis. Therefore, data analysis was a continuous 
process.
In order to maintain confidentiality pseudonyms have been used for the companies.
Field study: on the governance of facilities services
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The parties
This field study is about an interfirm relationship between a Client Firm (CF) and a 
Management Firm (MF). The relationship regards the outsourcing of facilities 
management in the Netherlands.
CF is a leading semiconductor company founded by the Parent Firm (PF) more than 50 
years ago. Headquartered in Europe, the company has about 29,000 employees working 
in more than 30 countries and posted sales of USD 5.4 billion (including the Mobile & 
Personal business) in 2008. CF creates semiconductors, system solutions and software 
that deliver better sensory experiences in TVs, set-top boxes, identification applications, 
mobile phones, cars and a wide range of other electronic devices. CF is a multinational 
company having its operations and customers in different countries in Europe, Asia and 
North America. In the Netherlands, the company is located at two sites, i.e. Nijmegen and 
Eindhoven.
MF is an Anglo-Dutch organization, located in the Netherlands. The organization 
possesses specialist knowledge of and has experience in the provision of management 
solutions for facilities services, appropriate for both public and private sector clients. The 
company strives to become the market leader in the European Total Facilities 
Management (TFM) market. MF is a joint venture between a UK-based company and a 
Netherlands-based company. It was founded in 2002 and currently it has various ongoing 
multi-million Euro contracts with international companies located in the Netherlands. 
Their first substantial contract was with the PF.
The nature o f the relationship
MF has a managing agent contract with CF. It does not provide facilities services itself. 
There are various suppliers that provide facilities services, and the contracts for facilities 
services are concluded directly between CF and different suppliers. MF only supervises 
and manages the contracting and delivery of facilities services. Hence, MF manages the 
relationships between CF and various suppliers of CF. A manager of CF depicted this 
relationship in a triangle as shown in figure 1.
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MF
Figure 1. The relationship triangle
As figure 1 shows, there is a contract between MF and CF for the management of the 
contracts between CF and suppliers. There is no direct contract between MF and the 
suppliers, but MF has a relationship with the suppliers to manage on behalf of the CF. A 
pictorial explanation of the relationship is given in figure 2 below:
Figure 2. The Interfirm Relationship and focus of the research
Figure 2 shows that CF and MF entered into a relationship where MF manages various 
suppliers who have contracts with CF. The diagram also shows the focus of research on 
control and trust between CF and MF.
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The contract between CF and MF is about the management of facilities services in the 
Netherlands for two sites, one in Nijmegen and the other at High Tech Campus 
Eindhoven (HTCE). The services are summarized in table 1:
Major type of Service Description
Building and Environment Fire prevention system, heating ventilation and 
air-conditioning (HVAC), environment and 
safety, technical maintenance, water 
management, energy and utilities management
Office Services Cleaning, reprographics, cleaning rooms 
cleaning, reception, parking, planting, data 
management and office supplies
Projects Capital works, space management, relocations 
and change management
Communications Multi client service desk, mail, telecom, courriers 
and signage
Hospitality Catering, conference, audiovisual services, 
flowers and event management
Table 1: The contracted services
The outsourcing contract included the transfer of five employees from CF to MF.
Table 1 reveals that the services are rather simple of nature. They can be programmed 
easily. Most of the services (cleaning, heating, ventilation and air-conditioning, energy 
and utilities, catering, conference management, and event management) are characterized 
by relatively high task programmability. The output of the services can be measured to 
some extent, although accurate measurability is difficult. There is relatively low asset 
specificity, because no investment had to be made for this relationship. Some services are 
highly repetitive (e.g; building and environment and office services) and some are less 
repetitive (e.g; hospitality). So, there is a mix of service transactions and there is high 
frequency.
A service provider is called an integrated service provider (Ventovuori, 2007) if it 
provides a package of different facilities services. But in this case MF is an integrated 
service manager and not an integrated provider because MF is only managing the 
contracts of various suppliers (with CF) of facilities services. The management of
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facilities services is rather difficult to measure and it has a relatively low 
programmability. However, there is relatively low asset specificity as there are no 
explicit investments required in the relationship, so there are switching possibilities for 
CF. Yet, it is relevant to note that it is difficult to benchmark MF since it provides 
management of various facilities services (a package of management).
Facilities services in CF fall apart into two types of services. These are the facilities 
services of offices and buildings at the one hand, and facilities services of wafer 
production and fabrication units (FABs) at the other hand. The contract between CF and 
MF only regards the management of facilities services for the offices and buildings (so- 
called soft services). The department within CF responsible for the soft services is Real 
Estate and Facilities Management (RE&FM) Netherlands and the department responsible 
for hard services to FABs is called Industrial Center Nijmegen (ICN). The management 
of hard services requires technological knowledge and is critical to the manufacturing 
processes. Hence, such management has not yet been outsourced to MF. Facilities 
services of FABs are managed in-house. As far as there are contractors involved, they are 
supervised and managed by the CF’s own engineers and staff and not by MF. The 
services handled by the ICN include piping, chemical supplies, gases, maintenance of 
cleaning room, and green filling drums.
Both the critical nature of the ICN facilities services and the doubt regarding the 
governance of these services is expressed by the managing director, as follows:
“Facilities management in the factory is crucial. I f  FABs close down for an hour the 
losses are huge. It takes us three days to run FABs again so FABs can’t be stopped. It 
means you need facilities management that has such a high quality that you know that 
FAB will never stop. ”
But, at the other hand, he thinks that even ICN facilities services are not core operations: 
“On the other hand, I  still think that other companies might do it better than we do it. 
Because it is not our core competence, so we are not spending sufficient management 
time to these kinds o f services. ”
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The choice to outsource soft services but not to outsource hard services is consistent with 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979; 1991). In the latter case, asset specificity, 
particularly business process specificity, is high. However, the doubt expressed by the 
manager opens up future possibilities for outsourcing. As will be demonstrated later on, 
the building of trust in the relationship with the external manager of the outsourced soft 
services enhances that possibility.
The terms of the relationship between CF and MF are laid down in a contract and in 
service level agreements (SLAs). The department at CF responsible for the relationship 
with MF and for developing SLAs, is the Real Estate and Facilities Management 
(RE&FM). Hence, for this research project, the inter-firm relationship between RE&FM 
CF and MF is relevant. The partial organization chart of CF showing RE&FM 
Netherlands and its relationship with MF is depicted in figure 3.
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Figure 3. Partial organization chart
The actors (managers of departments and outside organizations) directly involved in the 
interfirm relationship are shown in italics and bold in figure 3. In CF, there is a Board of 
Management and a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) at the top and the Country Manager 
Netherlands is reporting to this Board. The Country Manager (managing director) is 
responsible for all the operations in CF within the Netherlands. The head of the RE&FM 
NL department is reporting to the country manager. Furthermore, there are two facilities 
managers for both sites, i.e. Nijmegen and High Tech Campus Eindhoven (HTCE), who 
are reporting to the manager RE&FM NL and are also dealing with MF on an operational 
level. Further, at the bottom MF is managing the contracts concluded between CF and 
Suppliers. MF is responsible for the management of facilities services at both of the sites, 
Nijmegen and HTCE. Nijmegen has semi-conductor fabrication units (FABs), and the 
buildings are owned by CF here. HTCE houses CF’s headquarters but this building is not 
owned by CF but rented.
The development o f the relationship
Pre CF period (PF Semiconductors):
The relationship between CF and MF started in May 2006. At that time CF is part of the 
Parent Firm (PF), that included the business unit PF Semiconductors. So, the original 
decision to enter into the relationship is not made by an autonomous CF but by PF, 
particularly PF Real Estate Management and Services. The contract between that 
organization and MF is concluded in 2006 and spans a four years period. It expires in 
2010.
The decision by PF Semiconductors to outsource the management of facilities services to 
MF is closely related to prior experiences of other parts of PF with MF. A prior contract 
was signed between PF and MF in July 2003, which included the provision of facilities 
management services for 650,000 square meters of building space as well as the 
management of different types of services such as technical maintenance, security and
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catering. Approximately 60 employees of PF's facilities management operations were 
transferred to MF .
Based on the prior relationship PF Real Estate Management and Services decides to 
outsource the management of facilities services of PF Semi-conductors (now CF) in May 
2006. This decision is mainly driven by top management’s strategic consideration that the 
focus should be on core operations and that non-core operations should be outsourced. PF 
Semi-conductors (now CF) is not part of the decision; the contract is just handed over to 
PF Semiconductors’ management. A CF-manager expresses the process in this decision:
“We started out as part o f the PF organization and the decision to go to MF was a 
decision on a higher level, within PF. Focusing on core activities, that was the main 
focus and main reason to outsource at that time. The business case was not the reason to 
do the outsourcing to M F”.
In September 2006, PF Semi-conductors is sold to a group of private equity investors and 
CF comes into existence. In it’s early stage the relationship between CF and MF does not 
work properly because most of the managers in CF do not approve with the earlier 
decision to outsource the management to MF. Even the managing director is resistant.
The manager from MF also recalls that MF experienced problems in the relationship. 
Apparently, in his view CF’s management did not feel ownership of the outsourcing 
relationship.
CF and MF
At the start, the relationship between CF and MF is not working well. The manager of 
ICN speaks of a drama:
“And in the beginning it was a drama, the first years o f this outsourcing project was a 
drama for both parties because we didn’t know how to manage an outsourced activity 
and MF was also looking for let ’s say the ways how to do this and to deal with this 
environment. ”
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The MF account manager expressed a similar problem,
“The first half year was a struggle because we didn’t get any support from the Facilities 
Manager. ”
There were different reasons why the relationship was not working. First, the initial 
contract was not made between CF and MF but between PF Real Estate & Services and 
MF; it was just handed over to CF (PF Semi-conductors at that time). A manager at CF 
expressed it as follows:
“Yeah. Our management made some decisions and said this is the way to go. But this 
example was one step beyond that. Even the contract was presented as take it or leave it. 
It ’s perfectly okay i f  management says this is the way to go because that ’s the input you 
expect from management. I f  management goes one step beyond that and says that okay 
that ’s the direction we go and that ’s how we are going to do I, then indeed people feel 
bad. Feel that they don’t have influence actually on how to go and how to proceed in the 
direction. The decisions were taken two levels higher in the hierarchy. It ’s not just me 
who thinks like that. I  think I  am representing a lot o f people here. They (local 
management) said ok I  have learned to be what I  am. I  am paid to add value to this 
company and our management makes a decision. That ’s perfectly okay but management 
also fills in that decision. So step back and say okay. Since I  can’t influence things I  am 
stepping out o f the process and let them bounce against the stone wall and they will see 
what happens then. In fact that was how it worked, which perhaps is not good but it ’s 
perfectly human. ”
Second, facilities managers were expecting MF to do all the work itself. There was a lack 
of cooperation and coordination on the part of CF facilities manager. Thirdly, managers 
in CF thought that the old contract was not right and they also thought that some 
conditions in the contract were not appropriate for a good relationship and a good 
execution of the work. An example, why the initial contract was not encouraging, is
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pointed out by the purchase manager when he tells us that the incentive for the contractor 
apparently was too weak:
“[if] savings are 100% then we could, according to an incentive in the contract, write 
down that 80% of those savings are for us and 20% for them. That ’s how the old contract 
was written. It didn ’t work.... It didn ’t. They had to get more ”
A facilities manager also sees a lack of detail, clarity and comprehensiveness in the 
original contract. He suggests that a good formal control system can help in better 
coordinating the interfirm relationship:
“It was not clear for everybody what should be reached, who should do it, [who] is 
responsible for which actions. And if  you look at savings, savings is always a nice issue, 
uh who initiated it? Who is responsible for the results? Who gets paid for it? And if  you 
do not make that very clear you will always have discussions and it makes it very difficult 
to work together. So that was one big problem at the previous contract. ”
Apparently, interests were not properly aligned in the contract.
Then in the beginning of 2007 a new managing director as well as a new facilities 
manager enter CF. They revise the contract. Since then the relationship has been 
developing quite well. A manager of CF expresses it as follows:
“Then he [new Facilities Manager] came, a different person lets say and he was lets say 
more o f a team player. Also he ’s better than his predecessor and that helped a lot, 
because then he started investing into the community first here to understand ok how are 
things looked at and are there sensitivities and are there people not happy, that kind of 
things. He invested in the community you could say. In the meantime we also had another 
lets say brand manager [Managing Director] who was also more o f a practical side, 
pretty hands-on as a manager and lets say and the Purchasing Manager, you can say, is 
also quite a practical guy, lets say logged in to that as well and they started in principal
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restoring the relationship with MF, but at the same time also bringing the ambition level 
o f MF down. ”
CF concludes a new contract with MF. Given the developing institutional context, it does 
not really consider switching to another company. There are five aspects in the 
institutional context that need to be addressed. Firstly, the present contract with MF was 
still valid (until 2010). Secondly, some employees had already been transferred from CF 
to MF as per previous contract. Therefore, there would be legal and procedural 
implications in case of breach of the contract with MF. Thirdly, MF had competence 
reputation in the market and had big customers including PF. In fact, according to FM 
Market Report 2008 published by the Facilities Management Netherlands (a professional 
association in the field of facilities management which professionalizes facilities 
management in the Netherlands), it was number one in the top three integrated facility 
management (IFM) providers in the Netherlands. Therefore, it was legitimate to have a 
new contract with MF. Fourthly, the intra-organizational context had also changed 
because of the replacement of the facilities manager and the managing director. These 
new executives thought that CF itself was partly responsible for not properly managing 
the ‘demand management’- function. Fifthly, an important reason for remaining with the 
same MF is that CF was suffering from decline in sales and profits, and it wanted to 
become and stay flexible by reducing fixed cost and saving on non-core operations. It 
also wanted to economize on transaction costs. MF firm was one of the few companies 
which could manage the integral mix of facilities services. A switch towards another 
supplier would have entailed much effort to invest in the new relationship, thus implying 
transaction costs.
The new contract is concluded between CF and MF and the manager RE&FM. The head 
of FM CF group now labels the relationship as a ‘partnership based on mutual respect and 
trust’. Three important aspects of the relationship are ‘operational excellence’, ‘added 
value’ and ‘clear and open agreement’.
Since the revision of the contract in the beginning of 2007 there has been frequent 
cooperation, coordination, communication and information sharing between CF and MF 
at different management levels. Table 2 gives an overview:
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Meetings
Strategic
Tactical
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Frequency Description
xx
Overall contract review 
CF Netherlands 
CF Netherlands 
Per Site
Operational
Savings
Regular
Fortnightly
Weekly
Quarterly Review Quarterly Evaluation Report
(PMS-KPIs for savings & 
cost control, operations, 
customer satisfaction & 
finance)
Finance Quarterly
Yearly
Budget Tracker (open book) 
Budget
Purchasing Monthly Suppliers / Contracts
Table-2 Consultation and Communication between CF and MF in 2007
Table 2 shows much communication between CF and MF where the frequency of 
interaction ranged from a weekly to a yearly basis. This frequent interaction has made the 
relationship more effective and durable. MF also has a help desk at both sites.
Since the beginning of 2008, the format of meetings has been changed. Now there are 
fewer meetings. There is a monthly review meeting that is called a ‘road map discussion’ 
and a quarterly review. The manager RE&FM describes the monthly review (Roadmap):
“Road map I  mean what’s development, where we want to develop too. [Strategy], 
operations, savings and finance. These four items. And that’s me with the demand 
managers, the account manager from MF and the operation manager from MF. So with 5 
we are sitting and sharing things we are feeling. I f  I  have got the feeling that their 
organization is too poor [meaning doing poor], we discuss it. And I  ask them to present 
the change, to come with an idea, or ask them to recognize this andfind the improvement. 
So you finally come up with an improving process and be very focused on what you want 
to focus at. And it is actually, we made one sheet with line items, the same line items, 
technical, facilities management, demand management, savings, finance, euh operation
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and we defined the 1st situation, the current situation and where we want to be within one 
year. And also where we want to be in two years when the contract ends. And, so we are 
very focused on line item level where we want to have the improvement. And this actually, 
in this case you are able to focus very clearly on the steps to make with each other. ”
The future of the relationship
CF and MF have a very trusting relationship and therefore they want to move to the next 
step. At present, the relationship between CF and MF is at a Sourcing Solution level, 
wherein MF handles the operational part and most of the relational part. It does not 
handle the contractual part, however. One of the possibilities is, that CF would move to 
Management Solution wherein the operational, the relational and the contractual part of 
facilities management is handled by MF, while the strategic part remains with the 
outsourcer (CF). This is also called Total Facilities Management (TFM). This will 
improve CF’s flexibility and efficiency, but may increase dependency and, thus, increase 
transaction costs.
A similar prediction is made by the MF manager:
“ We are now looking at possibilities to make it a total FM arrangement so we can also 
take over the contracts so we can work on things as having more leverage because we 
have several accounts so maybe on more accounts we can challenge suppliers to do 
something about the tariffs and something like that. ”
However, TFM might increase transaction costs because of increased dependency. 
Contrary to the UK, TFM is not very well developed in the Netherlands. Therefore, it is 
difficult to find suppliers and there are limited switching possibilities.
Although managers express (in their own words) a weigh off between flexibility and 
efficiency at the one hand and transaction costs at the other hand, the trust in the present 
relationship indicates a decision for further outsourcing. This not only regards the 
movement from Sourcing to Management, but also regards the possibility to outsource 
the hard facilities services to FAB’s. The latter is also related to the fact that production is
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falling and is also moving to Asia. It might even be that FABs is closed within a couple 
of years. As the managing director (country manager) indicates,
“But due to the fact that FABs will be closed in next couple o f years it means we get 
problems that a number o f people in facilities management have to get fired, looking at 
the size of FABs ”
Accounting, control and trust in the relationship
All operational accounting issues are handled by MF. The suppliers send invoices to MF 
that, in turn, sends one or two monthly invoices to CF. This implies that all the costs are 
running through the books of MF. The invoices, sent to CF by MF, have three 
components, i.e. cost of services, organization cost and management fee. The costs of 
services correspond with the payments to be made to the suppliers and, to a large extent, 
these costs vary with the volume of work. Organization cost is a fixed fee charged by 
MF. The organization cost is agreed upon on a yearly basis. The management fee is 8 to 
10 percent of all the costs running through M F’s books. Any change in the management 
fee percentage has substantial consequences because it is calculated on total costs. 
Management fee is at risk when MF does not achieve cost savings targets. This is in fact 
an incentive- and penalty system. The system incentivizes the search for cost savings. If 
MF achieves the targets, it receives the fee. If MF does not achieve cost saving targets, 
the management fee is reduced accordingly. However, in case of savings that are higher 
than the target, both CF and MF share the excess savings equally. So, there is a strong 
incentive to search for savings.
MF is doing all the calculations and reporting for CF in this relationship. The manager of 
MF expresses:
“CF isn’t making any calculation. We are doing everything for them. We are making the 
business cases, we are trying to find out how it could be smarter, cheaper, more efficient 
than now [...] we make a quarterly report what we have done this quarter, we tell them 
about the financial situation, we tell them about the KPI set and the levels we are in, we 
tell them about the states o f the savings, we tell them about the operations how we are
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doing our business how satisfied is the end user how satisfied are they themselves so we 
will have a what we call ... Client Satisfaction Survey, we tell something about how 
suppliers are doing their business as well as we have a lot o f [....] improvement 
activities. ”
Sometimes, there are disagreements s between MF and CF. Although they might have 
caused problems in the relationship, it proves they turned the relationship into a 
partnership where issues are discussed together and solution are also agreed upon 
together.
The manager RE&FM recalls that their relationship is better than the relationship PF had 
with the suppliers. In is not only self-interest, reflected in a price, that counts, but there is 
more commitment to a stable relationship:
“[In] PF purchasing was always the method o f euh suppliers, there was a very strong 
customer supplier relation and the customer asked them, actually pushed them so deeply 
in their price levels, that they were not able to earn money. And you can do this, in some 
cases for some suppliers that ’s right, but on the other hand if  you don’t allow them to 
make money, they will never give you the right service, because they are not able to 
manage to deliver the right service. And it is finding the right levels. Traditional the PF 
purchasing department always worked in this way. Push, push push. And finally, being 
surprised that you don’t get the right service. ”
The facilities manager also has a good feeling about the relationship,
“[..] that’s one part, the contract changed, but also the way of working changed. There 
was more working together, more discussion, more communication, more respect. ”
Now CF and MF have (and aim at further building) a trusting relationship as can be seen 
from the following remarks of the country manager (managing director) of CF :
“At this moment we are working with MF for two years. Ifully trust them. But I  say, well, 
you do for me the whole purchasing part. I  don’t want to care about it. You choose the
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right supplier[...] Of course, we agree kind o f cost down targets year after year. There is 
also the matter whether our purchasing people trust MF enough that they say ok we 
won’t do it any more, you do the whole contract. Therefore, you have to build trust, that 
takes time. ”
He further adds,
“Yeah [..] when you outsource the important activity to a partner, you know you are 
becoming totally dependent on your partner. Then you need to build up the trust between 
those companies that you can have that interdependence because MF also becomes 
dependent on us. A large part o f their revenue is from CF company and i f  that drops out 
because we kick them out and ask someone else to do it, it is very badfor them. Then they 
feel it also in their bottom line. So as soon as you start doing outsourcing of important 
activities, you get interdependence between companies and you have to manage that 
interdependence. That ’s why I  know the boss o f MF. We have a review two times per year 
how does it go and have we built trust enough to outsource even more so to MF. ”
The above quote reveals that the manager views trust building to be a solution for 
growing interdependence. The reference to the dependence of MF on CF indicates that he 
considers a certain balance in dependency to be a kind of a safeguard in the relationship. 
Given this safeguard, further trust has to be built.
From the perspective of MF, trust building is inter alia reflected in the existence of a 
transparent open book system. Anyone can log into that system. The manager of MF 
says,
“Every client from CF, every demand manager can look in CF PMS[performance 
measurement system]. KPI [key performance indicator] systems they can see everything. 
So they can click on high level and then they can click through to the bottom. ”
Apparently, by opening up the books, MF seeks to show it’s commitment to the 
relationship and it’s willingness to act cooperatively in the interest of the relationship.
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The Accounting & Finance department of CF does not show much involvement in the 
relationship between MF and CF. The controller says:
“To be very honest, I  mean as a controller or finance guy, we are being interested in the 
very simple services at the lowest cost. That is what I  am there for. So whether i t ’s MF or 
anybody else, i t ’s really not something I  should be worried about. Its not my 
responsibility ”
And:
“But we are not decision makers. We are decision supporters. Final decision is to the 
Manager RE&FM and the country manager [Managing Director]. Very 
straightforward. ”
Different formal (contractual) and informal (non-contractual) sets of activities used to 
govern the relationship are shown in table 3 :
Formal or contractual activities Informal or non-contractual activities
Contract & Service level agreements and 
setting of target of saving of 500,000 euros 
every year
Open book system
PMS (KPIs) and Incentive-Penalty system 
(Gain sharing system)
Roadmap discussions
Quarterly report Joint development of business Cases
Monthly Review meeting (strategy, savings 
& control, operations, finance)
Budget tracker, commitment list and 
Benchmarking suppliers
Table 32: Formal and informal accouting activities
Table 3 shows that both formal and informal control activities are being performed by 
both CF and MF. MF is doing all formal accounting and control activities (including 
performance measurement system (PMS) using key performance indicators (KPIs) and 
monthly and quarterly review for CF. Budget tracker is a monthly overview of cost of
2 The table has been made just to clarify the distinction between formal and informal control. Formal and 
informal may be intertwined. For instance during a monthly meeting or a quarterly review meeting many 
informal signals are given and much informal information is shared between the parties that can affect the 
relationship positively or negatively.
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commitments to suppliers and the actual expenditure. This is prepared by MF. Similarly, 
the commitment list is also prepared by MF. The commitment list comprises the phone 
calls made on a location (Nijmegen or Eindhoven) to the service desk of MF. Regarding 
benchmarking, actual benchmarking of MF is absent since MF provides a rather unique 
and custom-made service: the management of a mix or package of different facilities 
services. The managerial ‘product’ delivered by MF carries a mix of activities, the output 
of which is hard to measure. There are some external measure based controls in place, in 
the form of cost saving targets (objectives) and in the form of a result-oriented incentive 
system. There are also informal (non-contractual) control mechanisms in place. They take 
the form of agreed upon more or less regular roadmap discussions and reviews. 
Moreover, there is voluntary action at MF to enhance transparency. MF benchmarks the 
suppliers of facilities services by transparently comparing the bids of different suppliers. 
They also transparently open up their books. A demand manager of CF can log into the 
PMS and immediately see the state of affairs. Furthermore, MF signals that it aims to 
help CF in producing a good business case and that it really tries to reduce costs. The MF 
manager:
“We are making the business cases, we are trying to find out how it could be smarter, 
cheaper, more efficient than now [..] we tell them about the states o f the savings, we tell 
them about the operations how we are doing our business, how satisfied is the end user 
how satisfied are they themselves [...] we tell something about how suppliers are doing 
their business as well as on our improvement activities. ”
At the other hand, CF also seeks to keep MF informed about future plans and strategies 
and to manage each other’s expectations. A CF manager:
“In the relation with MF it is very important that they are also involved and knowing 
where we are going to. That they are able to step on the train, instead o f missing the train 
and we have found a way, also by a meeting structure, how we are deploying this and 
about how we look at it and how we want them to look at it. But also ask them, what is
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your policy? As a company, where are you going to? What is your development? Where 
does MF want to be in a few years? ”
To sum up, both parties express that they have a stable and trusting relationship. It proves 
that there is both formal and informal (accounting) control. The contract is important in 
this regard, yet parties show additional commitment to the relationship by voluntary 
agreeing to additional informal control and by voluntary decisions to increase 
transparency. It is important that interests are aligned properly, yet safeguarding behavior 
is not up front. Building a stable and trusting relationship is. Accounting controls 
predominantly prove to serve coordination requirements and the building of trust. As far 
as there are appropriation concerns, they are in the background.
Developments in the governance o f facilities services: a summary
Table 4 chronologically summarizes the important events:
May 2006 Septembe
r-06
End 2006 Beginnin 
g 2007
End 2007 2008 2009 till 
Now (Sep- 
09)
Decision to Formation Change in Revision Achievement Achievement of Discussions
outsource of CF Local of of cost savings cost savings of Total
managemen Management contract targets by MF targets by MF Facilities
t of (New with MF and good and better management
facilities country interfirm interfirm (TFM) and
services of manager and relationship. relationship. outsourcing
PF new Reorganization Continuation of of the
Semicondu manager strategy of CF. reorganization management
ctors RE&FM) CF suffers 
losses in its 
core business.
strategy of CF. 
Financial crisis 
adds to the 
problems and 
huge losses 
suffered by CF.
of FABs
facilities
services.
Table 4: Timeline of the relationship
The timeline summarizes the history in terms of major events. The original decision to 
outsource the management of facilities services was made on the basis of previous 
experience PF had with MF in May 2006. It proves that PF had a trustworthy relationship 
with MF and as a result they also outsourced the management of facilities services of PF 
Semiconductors to them. The decision to outsource the management of facilities services
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was made just four months before PF sold PF Semiconductors to a group of private 
equity investors in September 2006. The local management (PF Semiconductors) is not 
involved in the outsourcing decision amid the news of sale of the PF Semiconductors. PF 
trusted MF. That’s why the PF Semiconductors’ contract is awarded to MF. Local 
management did not agree with the decision by top management. Although CF had no 
distrust in MF, this situation had a negative effect on the interfirm relationship between 
CF and MF. At that time, the country manager and the facilities manager did not show 
cooperative behavior. As a result, in the beginning the relationship between CF and MF 
was not working properly. Then, at the end of 2006, there is a change in the local 
management of CF. A new facilities manager (Manager RE&FM) and a country manager 
entered the organization.
In the beginning of 2007, the new local management revised the contract with MF. The 
revision took place in a certain institutional context: the present contract still had not 
expired, MF had a good reputation and five employees of CF had been transferred to MF. 
This event in the time line strongly affected both formal control and the building of trust. 
As for the formal control, the contract revision re-aligned interests of CF and MF by 
credible commitments in the form of cost savings targets, performance measurement 
systems and an incentive system. As for the incentive system, it was agreed that savings 
above target would be shared equally, thus producing contractual trust between partners. 
Because local management was actively involved in the process of contract writing, it 
produced ownership in the relationship. Therefore, the contract revision no doubt 
produced thin trust (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2009). But the contract 
revision (i.e. the change in the formal control system) also affected the cooperation and 
the building of thick trust (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). It produced 
positive expectations about the future. Such a building of thick trust is expressed by the 
managers and is reflected in the decrease in the information flow during 2008 (see table 
2). Moreover, the formal accounting and control practices stemming from the new 
contract helped producing thick trust. All the formal reports, financial or non-financial, 
were prepared by MF. At the end of 2007 MF met the cost savings target, and that 
achievement enhanced the level of competence trust. It also enhanced goodwill trust. For 
although the reduction in costs is very small as compared to the total operating costs of
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CF, the facilities management department was able to present good results in terms of 
cost savings in facilities services to CF’s senior management. In this way, the relationship 
with MF facilitated them in contributing to CF’s overall strategy aiming at a reduction of 
manufacturing facilities and reduce operating costs. MF proved to be a good ally in the 
positioning of the facilities department in CF.
The year 2008 brings another problem for CF in the form of a financial crisis. CF suffers 
huge losses in their core business. However, the relationship between MF and CF 
produced ‘super savings’ (beyond the target savings), thus further contributing to trust 
building.
In sum, the formal accounting and control practices in the two years 2007 and 2008 
produced a track record of competence and integrity. They therefore build thick trust in 
the relationship by creating positive expectations for the future. These positive 
expectations are reflected in many discussions taking place in 2009. Parties aim to 
enhance the scope of relationship by including the contract writing with suppliers (i.e. by 
further moving towards Total Facilities Management). Moreover, parties discuss 
possibilities to bring the facilities services to FABs into the relationship. Both parties 
show a strong commitment to these possibilities.
Theoretical implications
Our study has a number of theoretical implications. This section explores and, to a certain 
extent, builds upon them.
Contracting for safeguarding and trust building
While prior research theorizes that trust is particularly important and may be a 
replacement for control in transactional relations that are characterized by high 
complexity and environmental uncertainty (e.g; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 
2000), our study reveals that trust is also of significance in transactional relations 
characterized by relatively low or moderate levels of complexity and environmental 
uncertainty. Here, it does not replace control but it both adds to and interacts with control.
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Earlier work (Dekker, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2009) theorizes that 
formal control structures (in the form of performance management and incentive systems) 
are deliberately written down in a contract in order to align interests and, thus, in order to 
cope with appropriation concerns. However, our study suggests that this safeguarding 
aspect of contracting is not prevalent. The prevalent aspect of contracting is the 
inducement of commitment to the transactional relationship. This is consistent with 
Woolthuis et al., (2005) who argue and demonstrate that contracts serve various purposes. 
Starting from rather autonomous positions, by (re)negotiating a contract mutual 
ownership of the relationship is created. Furthermore, the accounting and control 
practices that stem from a formal contractual base (performance measurement and 
management) also induce the building of trust. This is not only due to the exchange of 
rather ‘objective’ performance information (as suggested by Tomkins, 2001), but to the 
possibilities parties have to express their normative and cooperative frames of the 
relationship. Apparently, both contracting and control practices are opportunities for 
expressing commitments to the relationship and, thus, for building trust. They shape 
expectations for stable and durable relationships. Therefore, this study suggests that 
contracting and formal control not only produce thin trust by compensating for legitimate 
mistrust (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), but first and foremost provide 
opportunities for the production of thick trust by giving relational signals (Lindenberg, 
2000; Chaserant, 2003; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Apparently, the 
building of thick trust may draw on formal controls and formal accounting information. 
External measure based control not only provides explicit incentives or constraints, but 
also provides opportunities for joint evaluations and problem solving. They may provoke 
dialogue and improve commitment to the relationship.
The emergence of informal control structures
Another theoretical implication of our study is, that the contract is not the only base for 
the exchange of formal accounting information, but that such a base may also be socially 
constructed in a more informal way. Once they feel ownership, parties also voluntarily 
agree upon and introduce periodical review meetings through which accounting
31
information is exchanged, or parties voluntarily decide to open up the books. In doing so, 
they institute rather informal structures through which interests are aligned, coordination 
is enhanced and commitment is expressed. The intensity of such informal structures, 
however, decreases as the trusting relationship evolves. This is consistent with Tomkins 
(2001).
Trust as implicit control
A further implication is that trust building should be conceptually distinguished from the 
design and use of informal control. Both formal control and informal control (or social 
control) are instituted in the relationship, and, as we demonstrated and theorized, they 
both can be vehicles for producing trust. Once trust is at a sufficient level, it proves to 
reduce the intensity of control. We suggest that once trust is at a sufficient level, the 
explicit (formal and informal) control structures are to some extent replaced by an 
implicit control structure. Trust building apparently results in structure as it is theorized in 
institutional theory (Giddens, 1984; Garud and Karnoe, 2001). It strengthens the 
embeddedness of agency. Similar to explicit controls, extant trust (and thus commitment 
to the relationship) constraints behavior to some extent and it provides implicit incentives 
to act in the interest of the relationship. Although parties enter the relationship out of self­
interest, it is through trust building that they show their willingness to act in the interest 
of the relationship, and, thus, to constrain and guide their behavior. Viewed from this 
perspective, the building of trust is a form of ‘control in the making’. It is a form that 
implicitly constraints and incentivizes behavior, and, thus, implicitly embeds agency. It 
prevents actors from acting opportunistically out of their self-interests without a demand 
for explicit structure. It thus mobilizes stable and durable relationships.
As is shown by our field study, trust as an implicit control structure may be the result of 
the working of (changes in) formal control systems and informal control systems. 
However, trust building is not restricted to the practicing of control structures, to control 
practices. It may stem from voluntary actions out of local positions, actions that are not 
directly induced through explicit control practices. More in general, human agency is at 
the heart of trust building, embedded as it may be. Embedded agency mobilizes the
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institution and practicing of formal and informal controls, and, through that, trust may be 
built by showing commitment to the relationship. Yet, embedded agency also mobilizes 
the building of trust in a more direct way. Parties that really want to cooperate in a proper 
way may signal that to each other in various ways. There is also a self-regulating process 
of relational signaling (Lindenberg, 2000; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), 
induced by parties’ interests in a stable relationship. For example, M F’s attention for 
potential improvements in the business processes at CF was not induced by a formal or an 
informal control structure, but was an act of agency. The informal control structures were 
a vehicle through which commitment could be expressed, not initiators. We suggest that 
it was a deliberate act by MF out of free space, driven by enlightened self-interest 
(Chaserant, 2003; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). MF seeks to cooperate 
appropriately in order to serve it’s long term interests.
We conclude that, essentially, both the institution and practicing of controls, and the 
signaling of commitment stemming from free space, are voluntary and deliberate actions 
to constrain the behavior of both the Other and the Self. Both institution and signaling 
produce structure, constraining and incentivizing behavior either explicitly or implicitly. 
This does not imply that social uncertainty or doubt about potential behaviors of other 
partners is completely eliminated. There always remains free space that can be used 
opportunistically by a partner. Therefore, as is theorized in earlier work (Vosselman and 
Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), parties involved will continuously search for signals that 
the others stay committed to the relationship.
In sum, explicit control proves to produce trust not only by aligning interests, but also by 
providing opportunities to show commitment to the relationship. Trust proves to produce 
implicit control, thus providing a powerful safeguard for opportunistic behavior. And 
formal accounting information proves to be a trust building as well as a safeguarding 
device.
The above discussion can be summarized in the following figure (4) which shows the 
interactive nature of control and trust, along with a description of how embedded agency
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(self action) influences explicit controls (i.e. formal and social controls) and implicit 
control (trust).
Figure 4. Explicit and implicit controls and embedded agency 
Interaction between control and trust in a developing institutional context
The interaction perspective on our field study shows how control and trust are 
dynamically related to each other and how such dynamics create a structure that 
mobilizes a stable and durable relationship. However, this does not imply that effective 
interaction automatically takes place. An important theoretical implication of our study is 
that control and trust (building) interact within a broader institutional context. 
Apparently, (changes in) this broader institutional context prove to be important for an 
effective interaction between explicit control and trust. Such changes in the broader 
institutional context are connected to the transactional relationship through boundary 
spanners. Boundary spanners represent their organization in the relationship. They are 
organizational members of each of the partner organizations who process information in 
the interfirm relationship (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009; Aldrich & Herker, 
1977; Perrone et al., 2003). There can be boundary spanners at least two levels in the 
hierarchy of an organization: the operating level and the corporate level. The initial award 
of the contract to MF by PF was done by the corporate boundary spanners based on their
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strategy to save costs and focus on core operations, on their own prior experience with 
MF, and on M F’s reputation as one of the market leaders. PF’s corporate boundary 
spanners concluded the contract and handed it over to the operating boundary spanners 
(local management of PF Semiconductors). This local management (operating boundary 
spanners) had no influence whatsoever on the contracting process. As a consequence, 
local management did not feel ownership and failed to further build structure in that 
relationship. As the original contract was not the result of local management’s agency, 
the (explicit and implicit) structure in the relationship could not really develop. Only 
when new boundary spanners entered the organization and renegotiated a contract with 
MF, ownership came into existence. The revision of the contract, however, was not the 
result of unconstrained agency. There were two obvious institutional constraints. One was 
that the extant contract had not expired yet, so there was a lock-in situation with MF. The 
other was, that employees had been transferred to MF and such transference also resulted 
in a lock-in situation because of the labour laws in the country. Yet, despite these 
constraints, as a consequence of the renegotiation and recontracting not only interests 
were realigned, but also the trust building process accelerated.
In sum, our study suggests that the role of boundary spanners is important for an 
acceleration of the interaction between control and trust (building). Moreover, our study 
suggests that it is important that the boundary spanners act from a rather autonomous 
position, i.e. they experience agency. Such agency may very well be embedded in a wider 
institutional context. A change in boundary spanners may mobilize such embedded 
agency.
Conclusion
This paper produces theoretical knowledge on the development in the governance of an 
interfirm relationship. Particularly, it emphasizes the interaction between control and trust 
and the way such interaction is embedded in developments of the institutional context in 
the relationship. It does so by reflecting on a specific outsourcing relationship regarding 
(the management of) facilities services.
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The field study gives evidence that the outsourcing of certain relatively simple services 
and the current in-house production of services that are very crucial to the primary 
business processes of the company, is consistent with a transaction costs economics 
(Williamson, 1991) based explanation of governance choices. Services characterized by a 
rather low level of complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity can be efficiently 
outsourced because outsourcing entails no strong dependency and, thus, relatively low 
transaction costs, while outsourcing services with a rather strong business asset 
specificity entails relatively high dependency and, thus, relatively high transaction costs. 
However, our analysis goes beyond a transaction cost based explanation as it is the 
processes in the events, the processes in governance, we are interested in. Our emphasis 
on process inter alia reveals that trust is an important mobilizer of, and not simply an 
alternative to control in complex and uncertain situations. Important events in the field 
study emerge in the area of contracting. An original contract, concluded by parties of 
which one was not directly involved with the further operational processing of the 
relationship, does not create ownership at the side of the outsourcing party. Although 
there is a formal contract between parties, the relationship between the original 
contracting parties does not develop the way it was intended. This particularly starts to 
get problematic when the outsourcing party separates from its parent company (that was 
the original contracting party). Only when new boundary spanners emerge, ownership in 
the outsourcing company develops. The contract with the contractor is renegotiated from 
a position of embedded agency. Although it is the managers’ free will that drives the 
renegotiation of the contract, to a certain extent there are institutional constraints. One is, 
that the current contract did not expire yet. Another is, that the transference of a number 
of employees as it was part of the original agreement had created a kind of ‘locked in’- 
situation. Yet, be it embedded, the agency in the renegotiation increases commitment to 
the relationship and accelerates the building of trust between the parties. Although the 
renegotiation also results in a realignment of interests between the parties by changing the 
incentive system, appropriation concerns are not up front in the renegotiating process. In 
the first place, parties’ intentions are not to safeguard their own interests, but too enhance 
a cooperative attitude. To them, the re-contracting process provides opportunities to show 
their commitments to the relationship.
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The control practices that stem from the renewed contractual arrangement and the 
accounting information that is part of them further enhance the building of trust. The 
control practices provide a vehicle for dialogue, for a joint production of the business 
cases and for joint problem solving. In addition to the contractual control practices, also 
control practices on a more informal basis emerge. Gradually, the intensity of these 
control practices decreases, thus reflecting not only a routinization of the work processes, 
but also the building of trust. This observation is consistent with the theorizing by 
Tomkins (2001) and Wicks et.al (1999).
Our study suggests that, in the first place, formal accounting practices do not produce thin 
trust by compensating for legitimate mistrust (as theorized by Vosselman and Van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2009), but produce thick trust. Formal accounting and control practices 
may first and foremost provide opportunities to show commitments to the relationship; to 
show cooperative attitudes and to signal an absence of short-term opportunistic behavior. 
This suggests that formal accounting and control practices are not primarily safeguarding 
devices, but trust building devices. Control produces trust. A second implication is that 
the building of trust does not increase the level of agency, but further embeds it by 
creating an implicit structure. Once it exists, trust has the potential to guide partners 
actions into a cooperative direction, and, thus, to implicitly incentivize and to safeguard 
against opportunistic behavior. Trust produces control. Yet, such implicit control retains 
partners’ perceptions that they act out of free will, be it in an embedded way. We suggest 
that it is this character trait of trust that keeps fueling the relationship and, thus, has the 
power to further develop that relationship. Trust may even produce new formal 
accounting and control structures that produce new vehicles for the building of trust.
Our study further implies that trust is not a designed social control mechanism or internal 
value based control system as opposed to an external measure-based control system, but 
that its development is intertwined with external measures and measurements. In 
addition, social mechanisms in the form of rituals, ceremonies, orientation programs and 
networking may provide vehicles for expressing trust.
Our study positions data in order to theorize the interaction between control and trust. It 
suggests how there may be an interaction between explicit and implicit control. That 
interaction occurs in a certain institutional context where boundary spanners prove to be
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very influential. It further suggests that it is the implicit control structure that has the 
highest potential to further develop the (governance in and of) the relationship. Such an 
implicit control structure is the result of positive attitudes and expectations. At the same 
time, safeguards against opportunistic behavior are created, but they are not up front. 
They are more a side effect of the building of trust.
We propose, that in situations where explicit safeguarding behavior is up front, the trust 
building process might be hindered. Then control structures and control practices might 
imply the opposite of what is intended: opportunistic behavior by the parties involved. 
Therefore, in order to build further theory it is essential to conduct more field studies, 
preferably also studies of relationships that did not succeed.
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Appendix 1 (Interviewees):
i. Director CF Netherlands (Country Manger)
ii. Real Estate & Facilities Manager CF Netherlands (two interviews)
iii. Facilities Manager CF Nijmegen
iv. Facilities Manager CF High Tech Campus Eindhoven
v. Director of Services Industrial Center Nijmegen
vi. Manager Facilities & Material Management Industrial Center Nijmegen
vii. Purchase Manager Nijmegen
viii. Manager Purchase Operations
ix. Controller accounting and finance
x. Controller CF Netherlands
xi. Account Manager MF
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Appendix 2 (List of Codes):
MF Information
Accounting by MF
Accounting by accountants
Accounting by non-accountants (CF)
Accounting role
Accounting tools
Ambiguity
Amounts
Background of manager 
Benefits
Capacity for Action 
Coercive Isomorphism 
Complexity
Consequences of relationship 
Continuous Change 
Cost savings 
Demand Management 
Economic Structure 
Events
Expected changes in future 
Field Institutional Entrepreneur 
Field of FM 
Field of CF 
Flexibility
Hierarchical Practices 
History of FM 
horizontal control
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Institutional Context 
Institutional Structure 
Interdependence 
Interest Dissatisfaction 
Legitimacy 
Leverage
Management Control 
Market Context 
Market Practices 
Mimetic Isomorphism 
non-core
Normative Isomorphism 
CF information 
Opponents
Organizational Institutional Entrepreneur
Path Dependency
Pattern of Value Commitments
performance management
Power Dependencies
Professionalization of MF
Rationalized Myths / Institutional Logics
Relationship information
Relationship Issues
Relationship Practices
Reputation
Social Structure
strategy
Technical Structure 
top management 
Trust
Type /nature of Services
45
Uncertainty 
vertical control
46
